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GROUND WATERS: ARE THEY BENEATH THE REACH 
OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
AMENDMENTS? 
Val P. Wilson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of ground waters l to the hydrological cycle and 
to society can not be overestimated. In the United States over 60 
billion gallons of ground water are utilized per day, which accounts 
for approximately 21.5% of our domestic, agricultural, and in-
dustrial water use.2 Fifty per cent of the water supply for irrigation 
• Staff member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
I BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1962 (4th rev. ed. 1968), defines subterranean waters thusly: 
Waters which lie wholly beneath the surface of the ground, and which either ooze and seep 
through the subsurface strata, without pursuing any defined course or channel, (percolat-
ing waters), or flow in a permanent and regular but invisible course, or lie under the earth 
in a more or less immovable body, as a subterranean lake .... 
YANNOCONE & COHEN, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES 451-52 (1972) [hereinafter cited 
as Y ANNOCONE] summarizes the geological background thus: 
Below a certain level underground, called the water table, the open spaces or pore spaces 
between the particles of clay, silt, sand, and gravel are completely filled with water under 
atmospheric or greater pressure. This part of the earth is the zone of saturation and the 
water confined in that area is called ground water. Often the terms zone of saturation and 
ground water reservoir are used interchangeably. The pore spaces of the material between 
the water table and the land surface are filled with a mixture of air, liquid water, water 
vapor and other gases. This part of the earth is called the zone of aeration, and the water 
contained therein is called vadose water. Hydrologists commonly refer to the vadose water 
in the soil zone just below the land surface as soil water and water in the layer immediately 
above the water table commonly is called capillary water. 
2 S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), United States CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. 
NEWS 3739 (1972). Summary Statement on Underground Water Resources, United States 
Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, in Hearings on H.R. 1073 Before the Sub-
comm. on Public Health and Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign 
Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 104 (1971) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; 
MCGUINNEsS, THE ROLE m' GROUND WATER IN THE NATIONAL WATER SITUATION, U.S. GEOL. 
SURVEY WATER SUPPLY PAPER No. 1800, at 1121 (1963); McGuinness, Ground Water-A Key 
Resource, GROUND WATER 24-29 (1965). 
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and livestock is derived from subsurface sources.3 Seventy-seven per 
cent of the public water systems depend upon ground water entirely 
or in part.~ One-third of the nation's largest 100 cities are supplied 
by ground water." Twelve to fifteen million families depend upon 
individual wells for water.R Fifty per cent of our population is sup-
plied by ground waters, at;1d many areas of the United States are 
totally dependent upon this resource to meet their water needs.7 As 
evidenced by the construction of approximately 500,000 new wells 
per year, the use of ground waters is expected to increase as demand 
for water resources continues to rise.K 
Pollution of ground waters has already occurred in some areasY 
and further pollution threatens to cause irrevocable damage to 
ground waters currently in use, and slow dissemination into poten-
tial subterranean and surface water supplies. lo Ground waters flow 
slowly from areas of greater hydrolic pressure to areas of lesser hy-
drolic pressure. II Thus, they move steadily into other ground waters, 
and are the major supplier of water for rivers, lakes, and streams. 12 
Since continual flow into other ground and surface waters occurs, 
and since much of the water presently being discharged from the 
" Testimony of Dr. Jay H. Lehr, Exec. Dir. of Nat. Waterwell Ass'n., in Hearings on S. 
4:1:1 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess., at 155 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings); Leaky Legislation, 
Wall Street Journal, June 7, 1972, reprinted in Senate Hearings, 155, 158 [hereinafter cited 
as Leaky Legislation). 
• [d. 
, Testimony of David Zwick, Pub. Int. Res. Group, in Supplemental Hearings on H.R. 
14899 Before the Sub. Comm. on Public Health and Environment of the House Comm. on 
Inter.~tate & Foreign Commerces, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 137 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
House Supp. Hearings); Leaky Legislation, supra note 3, at 155. 
• Testimony of Dr. Jay H. Lehr, in House Supp. Hearings, supra note 5, at 137; testimony 
of Dr. Jay H. Lehr, in Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 155; Leaky Legislation, supra note 
3, at 158. 
7 Testimony of William Ruckelshaus, Admin. of Environmental Protection Agency, in 
Hou.~e Hearing.~, supra note 2, at 357; W.B. CLAPHAM, NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 53 (1973). 
• S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) in UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. 
NEWS 3739 (1972); Testimony of Frand E. Clarke, Acting Dir., U.S. Geol. Survey, Dept. of 
Interior, in House Hearings, supra note 2, at 103. 
• Cox & Walker, Ground Water Implications of Recent Federal Law, 11 GROUND WATER 16 
(1973); WARNER, DEEP WELLS FOR INDUSTRIAL WASTE INJECTION IN THE U.S., FEDERAL WATER 
POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, WATER POLLUTION RESEARCH SERIES 
BULL. No.6 WP-20-10 (1967). 
,. S. REP. No. 91-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), in UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. 
NEWS 3739 (1972). 
" YANNOCONE, supra note I, at 454. 
12 S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) in UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. 
NEWS 3739 (1972). . 
19761 GROUND WATERS 547 
ground water reservoir has been moving throughout the system for 
hundreds or even thousands of years,13 pollution of subsurface wa-
ters in one location may cause the pollution of distant waters years, 
decades, or centuries in the future. Absent from ground waters are 
the organisms and necessary circulation which cause surface waters 
to possess a self-cleansing characteristic. Thus, once polluted, 
ground waters remain unusable for periods as long as several centu-
ries. 14 If our subsurface waters are to be preserved for continued 
beneficial use, ground water pollution must be abated before it oc-
curs on a substantial scale. IS 
1. MECHANISMS FOR GROUND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 
Ground water pollution will cause permanent and irreparable 
harm unless control mechanisms are effectively utilized. The 
common law, the Safe Drinking Water Act,16 and the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Actl7 are the currently available modes of ground 
water pollution abatement. If utilized in concert, these mechanisms 
should provide adequate protection to the nation's ground water 
resource. 
A. The Common Law 
Common law actions have been utilized to recover damagesl8 and 
'" Y ANNOCONE, supra note I, at 454. 
" S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) in UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. 
N~;ws 3739 (1972); Cox & Walker, Ground Water Implications of Recent Federal Law, 11 
GROUND WATER 16 (1973); YANNACONE, supra note 1, at 454; Testimony of Edward Hockman, 
Special Projects Assistant, Environmental Protection Agency, in House Supp. Hearings, 
supra note 5, at 137. 
" For further authorities on ground water and ground water pollution, see VAN DE LEEDEN, 
GROUND WATERS: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1971). For an authority which has been effec-
tively utilized in litigation and offered into evidence in federal and state courts, and which 
YANNACONE calls the "finest available attempt to convey sophisticated scientific information 
to the layman without condescension and should be in the library of every attorney and 
scientist concerned with the problem of water for human needs and the maintenance of our 
environment," supra note 1, at 454, see COHEN, FRANKE & FOXWORTHU, AN ATLAS OF LONG 
ISLAND'S WATER RESOURCES (1968). 
" The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (Supp. IV, 1974). 
17 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II, 
1972). 
" Damages were recovered in Swift & Co. v. People's Coal & Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 186 
A. 629 (1936); Shelley V. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W. 2d 518 (1931); Beatrice 
Gas CO. V. Thomas, 41 Neb. 662, 59 N.W. 925 (1894); Master V. Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540, 
140 S.E. 89 (1927); Cities Service Co. v. Eggers, 186 Okla. 466, 98 P.2d 1114 (1940); Ulmen 
V. Mt. Angel, 57 Ore. 547, 112 P. 529 (1911); Gilmore V. Royal Salt Co., 84 Kan. 729, 115 P. 
541 (1911); Augustine v. Hinnen, 201 Kan. 710, 443 P.2d 354 (1968); Sandstone Spring Water 
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to enjoin ground water pollution.!!1 The inadequacies of common law 
abatement of pollution are magnified, however, when applied to 
subterranean waters. Common law actions are available only to 
plaintiffs who have a possessory interest in land damaged by ground 
water pollution. 211 In some jurisdictions a distinction is made be-
tween percolating21 and flowing ground waters, and recovery for 
damages caused by polluted percolating ground waters is barred by 
the absence of negligence or malice.22 In these jurisdictions, ground 
waters are presumed to be percolating, unless flow is conclusively 
demonstrated without underground excavation. 23 Further, a com-
mon law action to abate ground water pollution can not succeed 
without proof of negligence, nuisance, or trespass. 24 Even if these 
obstacles are surmounted, however, a common law action will fail 
unless plaintiff can sustain the burden of proving a causal connec-
tion between the damage suffered and the pollution alleged. 25 Since 
ground water movement is inherently difficult to trace, this causal 
connection is often difficult to demonstrate in the ground water 
context, rendering state common law remedies largely ineffective. 
The federal common law is equally ineffective in controlling ground 
Co. v. Kettle River Co., 122 Minn. 510,142 N.W. 885 (1913); Tevis v. McCary, 72 N.M. 134, 
:~81 P.2d 208 (1963); Ballantine & Sons v. Public Servo Corp., 86 N.J.L. 331, 91 A. 95 (1914); 
Ball V. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868); Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 154 Mont. 414, 465 P.2d 
:114 (1970). Injunctions were issued in Love V. Nashville Agriculture & Normal Institute, 146 
Tenn. 550, 243 S.w. 304 (1922); Haveman V. Beulow, 36 Wash.2d 185, 217 P.2d 313 (1950). 
" For comprehensive examination of common law actions to abate ground water pollution, 
see Anno!., 38 A.L.R2d 1265 (1954); Davis, Ground Water Pollution: Case Law Theories For 
Relief, 39 Mo. L. REV. 117 (1974); Nixon, Ground Water Pollution in the Western States-
Pril'ate Rpmedies and Federal and State Legislation, 8 LAND & Water L. Rev. 537 (1973); 61 
AM .. JtIR. 2d, Pollution Control §§ 96, 97, at 903-05 (1972); 78 AM .• JUR. 2d, Waters §§ 146-
194, at 593-643 (1975). 
211 Annat., 38 A.L.R.2d 1265 (1954). 
21 For a discussion as to the factual distinction between percolating and flowing ground 
waters, see note 1, supra. 
22 McGowan V. United States, 206 F. Supp. 439, 442 (D. Mont. 1962); Upton V. Bd. of 
Health, 46 Mich. 542, 9 N.W. 845 (1881); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 RI. 411, 173 A. 
627 (1934). Comment, Liability of Land Owner for Pollution of Percolating Waters, 39 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1199 (1955). 
2" Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1265 (1954); McGowan V. United States, 206 F. Supp. 439, 442 (D. 
Mont. 1962). 
21 [d., United States V. 31.07 Acres of Land, 189 F. Supp. 845 (D. Mont. 1960) (trespass); 
McCoy V. Cohen, 140 S.E.2d 427 (1965). 
" Annot., 38 A.L.R2d 1265, 1268 (1954). For example, causal relations were held not shown 
in Continental Oil CO. V. Hinton, 175 So.2d 512 (Miss. 1965); McCoy V. Cohen, 140 S.E.2d 
427 (W. Va. 1965); United Fuel Gas CO. V. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953); Panther Coal 
CO. V. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946); Reiserer V. Murfin, 183 Kan. 597, 331 P.2d 
313 (1958). 
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water pollution since, in addition to limitations imposed by com-
mon law doctrines, interstate pollution is also required. 26 
B. The Safe Drinking Water Act 
Designed to protect certain underground sources of drinking 
water,27 the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)2K directed the Admin-
istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)29 to publish 
proposed regulations for state plans within 180 days after December 
16, 1974.:111 Within 180 days after the proposed regulations' publica-
tion, the Administrator was to promulgate regulations defining the 
minimum standards which state plans must meet in order to be 
approved.:11 These minimum requirements were to prohibit, in a 
state adopting a permit program, any underground injection:l2 not 
authorized by a permit, and, in a state adopting a program allowing 
injection by rule,:l:! any rule authorizing underground injection en-
dangering drinking water sources within the SDWA. The regula-
tions were to adequately provide for inspection, monitoring, record-
keeping, and reporting.:l4 The Act also directed the Administrator to 
publish a list of states which, within 270 days of the list's publica-
tion,:l;' were to submit a plan. Within 90 days of the submittal, the 
Administrator was to either approve or disapprove of the plan in its 
entirety or in part::lft if the Administrator disapproved the State 
program, or if the state did not submit a proposed plan, the Admin-
istrator was directed to promulgate a plan applicable to that state;:l7 
and if the Administrator approved the state plan, the state then had 
primary enforcement responsibility for underground water sources.:lK 
" Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protec· 
tion Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1974); Texas v. Dankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 300 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 300f (Supp. IV, 1974). For an extensive analysis of the Safe Drinking Water 
Act, see T. Douglas, Safe Drinkin!J Water Act of 1974: History and Critique, 5 ENv. AFF. 501 
(1976). 
'" The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency is hereinafter referred to as 
"the Administrator." 
III These regulations have been promulgated, 40 Fed. Reg. 59567 (1975). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 300h(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" Underground injection is the subsurface employment of fluids by well injection. [d. § 
300h(d)(I). 
'" [d. § 300h(b)(l)(A)&(B). 
" [d. § 300h(b)(l)(C). 
15 [d. § 300h.1(b)(1)(A). 
" [d. § 300h·1(b)(1)(B)(2). 
'" [d. § 300h·1(c). 
" [d. § 300h.1(b)(1)(B)(3). 
550 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:545 
In the absence of proper state action,39 the Administrator was au-
thorized to commence a civil action to require compliance with any 
requirement of an applicable underground injection control pro-
gram. Citizens suits were also permitted against any violator or 
against the Administrator, where a failure to perform a non-
discretionary act or duty is alleged, without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties.~o Finally, the SWDA 
authorized judicial review of any regulation for state underground 
injection control programs in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia CircuitY 
The Safe Drinking Water Act was designed to protect a signifi-
cant portion of America's underground drinking water supply. Al-
though comprehensive in this regard, it should not be interpreted 
as being the only mode of ground water pollution control, nor should 
it be interpreted as a pre-emption of other mechanisms, such as the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.42 The SDWA only applies to 
ground water "which supplies or can reasonably be expected to 
supply any public water system."43 Since ground waters which are 
distant from present population centers, or proximate to areas uti-
lizing surface resources for drinking water, may not be waters which 
can reasonably be expected to supply a public drinking system, they 
are beyond its scope. Nor will the SDWA reach ground waters uti-
lized for purposes other than for drinking, such as those ground 
waters which are used for irrigation and for industry.44 
In addition, the Safe Drinking Water Act does not affect under-
ground drinking water which supplies non-public systems. It defines 
a "public water system" as "a system for the provision to the public 
of piped water for human consumption, if such system has at least 
fifteen service connections or regularly serves at least twenty-five 
individuals."~5 It will not reach numerous smaller systems, includ-
ing a significant proportion of the twelve to fifteen million private 
family operated wells which depend upon uncontaminated ground 
water.4ft 
:I, [d. § 300h-2. 
'" [d. § 300j-B. Section 300j-B(c) allows the Administrator or the Attorney General to 
intervene as a matter of right. 
" 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
12 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II, 1972). For arguments that ground waters are within the 
FWPCA see text at notes 73-165, infra. 
&:, 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
" See .~upra note 3, and accompanying text. 
15 42 U.S.C. § 300f(4) (Supp. IV, 1974) . 
.. See text at note 6, .~upra. 
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The scope of the SDWA is further limited to states which, in the 
judgment of the Administrator, have drinking water sources which 
are endangered by underground injectionY If the listing of these 
states is interpreted as being discretionary, then the exclusion of a 
state may not be subject to judicial review, since citizen suits 
against the Administrator are allowed only when a failure to per-
form a non-discretionary duty is alleged. 48 The application of the 
SDWA is also limited to ground water pollution caused by the sub-
surface implacement of fluids by well injection,49 and thus, ground 
water pollution caused by point sources other than wells may be not 
affected by the Act. all 
Given its limitation to certain underground drinking water sup-
plies and the possible exclusions from its coverage of a certain num-
ber of states and non-well subsurface discharges, especially consid-
ering the serious and permanent consequences of ground water 
pollution, the SDW A should not be interpreted as a pre-emption of 
other ground water pollution control mechanisms. Indeed, the au-
thors of the statute wisely precluded pre-emption by including the 
following language: 
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or 
class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any requirement prescribed by or under this subchapter 
or to seek any other relief (emphasis added).51 
C. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
The objective of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act52 is to 
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integ-
rity of the Nation's waters":;:l by eliminating the discharge of pollu-
11 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
" Id. § 300j-8 (1974). For a discussion of judicial review of discretionary agency actions, 
see DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, §§ 28.05-30.06 (1972). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) (1974). 
'" In contrast, the FWPCA encompasses discharges from point sources which are defined 
as "any discernable, confined, and discreet conveyance." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. II, 
1972). 
,,' 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
" 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 11,1972). For commentaries on the FWPCA, see McMahon, The 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rev. 672 
(1973); Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 77 DICK. L. REV. 
459 (1973); Rasmussen, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, WIS. 
L. REV. 893 (1973). For legislative history, see UNITED STATES CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 
3668-3833 (1972); A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
AM~:NI)MENTS at' 1972, U.S. Government Printing Office (1972). 
,,' 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. 11,1972). 
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tants into navigable waters by 1985.,,4 The Act defines navigable 
waters as "waters of the United States, including the territorial 
seas,""" and it forbids the discharge of any pollutant from any point 
source except when in compliance with a permit issued pursuant to 
the FWPCA."r. It directs the Administrator57 to promulgate effluent 
limitations for point sources which shall require the application of 
the best practicable technology by July 1, 1977, and the best avail-
able technology economically feasible by July 1, 1983.58 The Act 
authorizes the Administrator to commence a civil action against any 
person discharging pollutants in violation of the applicable provi-
sions of the FWPCA,,,9 and citizens to sue any person alleged to be 
in violation of an effluent standard limitation or order promulgated 
under the FWPCA. Citizens can also sue the Administrator when a 
failure to perform a non-discretionary duty is alleged, without re-
gard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. flO 
Since the Safe Drinking Water Act is limited in scope, and since 
the common law is limited in force, the FWPCA would appear to 
be the key to preventing the permanent and onerous consequences 
of ground water contamination. However, the Federal District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas has raised a serious question as 
to whether the FWPCA is applicable to ground waters in its decision 
of United States v. GAF Corporation. flt This decision is disturbing 
to those concerned with ground water pollution, since the control 
mechanisms outside the FWPCA are severely limited. The possible 
broad-ranging effect of the court's decision suggests that its holding 
should be subjected to close scrutiny. The remainder of this article 
will evaluate the court's reasoning in GAF, and marshal the argu-
ments for and against inclusion of ground waters within the protec-
tion of the FWPCA. 
',I [d. § 1252(a)(I). For argument that ground waters are navigable waters as defined by 
the FWPCA see text at notes 114-143, infra. For argument that ground waters are within the 
FWPCA as tributaries or portions of navigable waters, see text at notes 152-163, infra. 
>c, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972). 
" [d. § 1311. Discharges of pollutants in accordance with the terms of aN ational Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, ([d. § 1342) are in compliance with the Act. 
"~I The FWPCA, like the SDWA, is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency. 
:~:1 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. II, 1972). 
.i> 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. II, 1972). Section 1362(11) defines "effluent limitation" as: 
any restriction established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and 
concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are dis-
charged from point sources into navigable waters .... 
". 33 U.S.C. § 1:119(a)(:1) (Supp. II, 1972). 
'" [d. § 1365. 
" :~R9 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GAF]. 
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II. UNITED STATES v. GAF CORPORATION 
The United States, as plaintiff, sought to enjoin defendant GAF 
from using two deep injection wells for the subsurface disposal of 
organic chemical wastes,82 contending that GAF could not discharge 
pollutants from the wells at issue, without first securing a permit 
issued pursuant to the FWPCA.83 The defendant corporation argued 
that subsurface injections were beyond the jurisdiction of the 
FWPCA.64 
The defendant's motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over 
the subject matter and for failure to state a claim were granted by 
the court65 on the ground that the proposed subsurface injections of 
pollutants were not discharges within the scope of the FWPCA.66 
The court offered two bases for its holding. The first ground was the 
absence of effluent limitations promulgated by the EPA which were 
applicable to the proposed dischargeY A detailed consideration of 
this unsettled question is beyond the scope of this decision. 8K 
R2 The United States applied to the court for a temporary restraining order to prevent the 
drilling process from proceeding beyond the stage where geological samples of the substrata 
could be taken. After the parties agreed to a preservation of the status quo for the duration 
of the action, the focus of the case shifted to plaintiff's request that the defendant be enjoined 
from using, as opposed to drilling, deep wells allegedly in contravention of the FWPCA; 389 
F. Supp. at 1380. No dispute existed that the materials defendant proposes to discharge are 
pollutants since "pollutant" is defined in 33 U.S.C.A. § 1326(6) to mean, inter alia, "chemical 
wastes." 389 F. Supp. at 1383. 
0:' No presentation was made to the court on the nature of the strata into which exit the 
wells in question. For the purposes of the decision it was assumed that the pollutants would 
be discharged into subterranean waters, 389 F. Supp. at 1383. Since ground waters percolate 
or flow from areas of greater to lesser hydrolic head (see supra note 1 and text at note 11), 
however, discharges into dry subsurface strata will eventually be reached by ground waters. 
The action was brought under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) which states: 
Whenever ... the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of section 1311, 
1312, 1316, 1317, or 1318 of this title or is in violation of any permit condition or limitation 
... he shall ... bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section. 
" 389 F. Supp. at 1381. 
" [d. The action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, FED. R. CIV. 
P. 12(b)(1); and for failure to state a claim, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
6ft 389 F. Supp. at 1383. 
" The court phrased its reasoning thus: 
Even if defendant's proposed injection disposal would constitute a 'discharge of a pollu-
tant' within the meaning of § 1311(a), the defendant will not be in violation of any 
applicable provision with the meaning of § 1319(a)(3). Id. at 1385. 
It further stated: "It is only when the Administrator establishes effluent limitations under § 
1312 that it becomes possible to violate the limitations and, with them, the section under 
which they were issued." [d. at 1387. 
OM For cases in accord with the OAF holding see Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United 
States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 63 
(5th Cir. 1974). Rut see NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States 
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The second, clearly independent, ground for dismissing the action 
was that the proposed discharges of pollutants were not discharges 
under § 1311(a) of the FWPCA.A9 Ti1e court offered two distinct 
theories to support this finding. First it stated that "the disposal of 
chemical wastes into underground waters which have not been al-
leged to flow into or otherwise affect surface waters does not consti-
tute a discharge of a pollutant within the meaning of Section 
1311(a)."711 If this rule is adopted, only ground waters which flow 
into or otherwise affect surface waters will be interpreted as within 
the ambit of the FWPCA. Since the opinion fails to identify the 
party who would bear the burden of proving or disproving that 
ground waters flow into or affect surface waters, and since the 
amount of flow or effect upon surface waters necessary to bring 
particular ground waters within the FWPCA is not defined, the 
portion of the nation's ground waters that would actually be pro-
tected under this holding is unclear. The court also based its finding 
of no discharge within the FWPCA upon its ruling that "the regula-
tion of subsurface discharges is not within the enforcement purview 
of the [FWPCA]."71 Under this holding, all ground waters would 
be excluded from FWPCA regulation, irrespective of whether partic-
ular ground waters flow into or otherwise affect surface waters. Al-
though the court's opinion is unclear as to which rule oflaw supports 
its finding of no discharge, its main thrust aims at supporting the 
latter broader holding, which would exclude all ground waters from 
the enforcement purview of the FWPCA.72 
Regardless of which rule the court did in fact apply to justify the 
finding of no discharge, the decision in GAP is arguably inconsistent 
with Sierra Club u. Lynn,73 a decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals which includes the GAP district court within its jurisdic-
tion. In Lynn, the Sierra Club alleged that the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development violated its duty under the FWPCA74 
when it offered to guarantee a private bond issue for the develop-
v. Holland, 378 F. Supp. 665, 667, 676 (M.D. Fla. 1974). Above cases distinguished in GAF, 
389 F. Supp. at 1385, 1386. For analogous fact situation applying to § 13 of Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407, see; United States v. Pennsylvania Chern. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 
(1973). Rut see id. at 411 U.S. 668, 689 for language indicating decision is inapplicable to 
FWPCA. 
"' :l89 F. Supp. at 1383. 
'" [d. 
7\ [d. 
72 [d. at 1383-84. 
7:t Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Lynn]. 
71 33 U.S.C. § 1368(c) (Supp. II, 1972). 
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ment of a new ranch city that threatened to pollute the underground 
water supply of San Antonio, Texas.7!i The Fifth Circuit held that, 
in the absence of evidence that the new ranch city would pollute the 
ground water and degrade established standards of water quality, 
the plaintiff had failed to show a violation of the FWPCA.76 Thus, 
plaintiff apparently failed only as a result of not sustaining a burden 
of proof. No ruling or inference was made that ground waters were 
beyond the reach of the Act. In fact, the Lynn court assumed that 
the FWPCA applied: 
It is undisputed that the developer must meet any state or federal stan-
dards that may be established in the future. More importantly, the 
developer must act to prevent the Ranch from degrading the existing 
water quality in the aquifer. If the Ranch is discovered to be polluting 
the underground water supply, the developer has the legally enforceable 
duty to remedy the situation.77 
The court in GAF stated that the Lynn case was not "remotely 
similar" since in Lynn the allegedly jeopardized subsurface strata 
contained the water supply for the San Antonio, Texas Metropoli-
tan area. 7X In effect, therefore, the court in GAF held that subsurface 
discharges are not within the FWPCA unless the particular ground 
waters are of sufficient importance to justify regulation. This excep-
tion for significant waters finds no basis in the statute, the legisla-
tive history, or in the reasoning of GAF. Rather than distinguishing 
Lynn, the court in GAF carved out an exception for underground 
metropolitan water supplies. 
Further weaknesses are evident in the GAF opinion. The court 
relied upon legislative history to sustain the finding that the 
FWPCA does not apply to subsurface discharges. 7Y Language from 
the applicable Senate Report, XII and the rejection of an amendment 
by the House of Representatives,RI were held to demonstrate Con-
gressional intent to exclude ground waters from the ActY The 
amendment would have expressly included ground waters within 
75 .502 F.2d at 48 (.5th Cir. 1974). 
76 [d. at 64. 
77 [d. at 63, 64. 
" 389 F. Supp. at 1383. Curiously. plaintiff "agreed that the case was not directly rele-
vant." [d. 
79 389 F. Supp. at 1383. 
'" S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), in UNITED STATES CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 3667-3833 (1972). 
" 118 CONGo REC. 10666-69 (1972). 
K2 389 F. Supp. at 1383. 
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the enforcement sections of the FWPCA,H3 and the court viewed its 
defeat as a strong indication of Congressional intent to exclude 
ground water from FWPCA regulation.H4 The House did not ex-
pressly decline to enact subsurface discharge regulation, however, 
when it defeated the Aspin Amendment. Only the first section of the 
amendment concerned inclusion of ground waters. The second sec-
tion of the amendment, which was not discussed by the court, was 
directed at certain privileges enjoyed by the oil and gas companies,H5 
which are presently embodied in § 1362(6) of the FWPCA.H8 A large 
part of the debate recorded in the Congressional Record concerned 
the propriety of the second section of the amendment, rather than 
the desirability of the first.H7 Congressman Roberts, for example, 
urged his colleagues to reject the amendment, notwithstanding his 
agreement with the ground water section. HH Since inclusion of 
ground waters constituted only one section of the amendment, and 
since the other section involved an issue which received greater 
public attention than subterranean water regulation, the defeat of 
the proposed amendment should not be interpreted as a rejection 
of FWPCA ground water pollution abatement. 
The court found additional support for its opinion in the following 
quotation from the Senate Report on the bill which became the 
FWPCA:H9 
Several bills pending before the Committee provided authority to estab-
lish Federally approved standards for ground waters which permeate 
rock, soil, and other subsurface formations. Because the jurisdiction 
regarding ground waters is so complex and varied from State to State, 
the Committee did not adopt this recommendation. DO 
The court stated that the above passage was "an unequivocal recital 
in the Senate Report that the regulation of subsurface discharges is 
'" 118 CONGo REC. 10666 (1972). 
" :189 F. Supp. at 1384, citing Gulf Oil Corp. V. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974) . 
." 118 CONGo REC. 10666 (1972). "The second thing our amendment does is eliminate the 
inconsistency between the way we treat oil companies in this bill and the way we treat other 
companies." (remarks of Congressman Aspin) . 
.. :13 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (Supp. II, 1972). For argument that this section indicates that ground 
waters are within the FWPCA, see text at notes 97-99 infra. 
M7 118 CONGo REC. 10666-68 (1972). 
" "I agree with the gentleman in his basic Statement concerning ground water, but he is 
talking about two different things here. Mr. Chairman, I urge that this amendment be 
rejected." [d. (remarks of Congressman Roberts). 
" S. R~;p. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. 
NEWS :1669-3833 (1972). 
"" [d. at :17:19. 
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not within the enforcement purview of the Act"91_a rigid conclu-
sion, considering the ambiguity of the Senate Report language. In 
addition, the impact of the quoted passage on the regulation of 
effluent discharges into ground waters is difficult to judge. "Feder-
ally approved standards" can be interpreted as pertaining only to 
ambient water quality standards under § 1313 of the FWPCA.92 This 
interpretation of the language found in the Senate Report does not 
preclude promulgation of effluent limitations for subsurface dis-
charges of pollutants, and it is consistent with the deference to state 
water quality standards expressed in the Senate Report.93 Since 
effluent limitations are standards set for wastes to be discharged 
into the receiving waters, and are not directed at the quality of the 
receiving water per se, the promulgation of effluent limitations, un-
like federal ambient water standards, would not affect state regula-
tion of the receiving waters. A literal reading of the language in 
question supports the view that it refers only to ambient standards, 
since the Senate Report expresses concern over "federally approved 
standards for ground waters," rather than standards for what is 
discharged into ground waters.94 Thus, the court in GAF relied on 
legislative history which does not compel the conclusion that ground 
waters are not within the reach of the FWPCA. 
Beyond its questionable interpretation of legislative history, the 
court lightly dismissed several strong arguments advanced by the 
United States for inclusion of ground waters within the FWPCA. 
The FWPCA defines "point source" as "any discernable, confined, 
and discreet conveyance, including, but not limited to any ... 
well"95 (emphasis added). The inclusion of wells in the definition of 
"point source," the United States contended in GAF, is only ex-
plainable if the FWPCA applies to subsurface discharges. 96 The 
FWPCA also excludes from the definition of "pollutant" certain 
injection discharges made in connection with the production of oil 
and gas. 97 Again, the United States contended that the exclusion of 
oil and gas injection discharges from the definition of "pollutant"9K 
" 389 F. Supp. at 1383. 
" 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. II, 1972). An ambient standard pertains to the quality of the 
receiving water whereas an effluent standard pertains to what is discharged,into the water 
from a particular point source. 
'" S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). 
" [d. 
" 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. II, 1972). 
" 389 F. Supp. at 1384. 
" 33 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (Supp. II, 1972). 
" [d. 
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is only necessary if subsurface discharges are within the reach of the 
Act. BO Finally, the FWPCA forbids the approval of any state plan 
lacking the requisite authority to "control the disposal of pollutants 
into wells"HlO (emphasis added). The United States contended that 
the authority to control disposal wells at the federal level is therefore 
a necessary implied provision of the FWPCA.lol 
Reliance on the above provisions was rejected by the court as "an 
indirect route to arrive at a conclusion contrary to that which the 
straight path of legislative history leads."lo2 The court characterized 
plaintiff's arguments as "speculation as to what Congress might 
have meant when the legislative history is boldly conclusive as to 
what Congress must have meant."I03 Even if the legislative history 
is as unambiguous as the court suggests,104 a serious question exists 
as to the propriety of relying upon legislative history rather than the 
language of the FWPCA itself,105 which expressly includes disposal 
wells within the Act.IOft 
As an additional ground for dismissing the government's argu-
ments, the court held that the sections of FWPCA cited by plaintiff 
in support of inclusion107 were not intended to apply to the enforce-
ment provisions of the Act. IOS Thus, the inclusion of "wells" within 
the FWPCA's definition of "point source"IOB applies to the require-
ment that a state plan must have adequate authority to control 
disposal well pollution,llo but not to federal regulatory authority.111 
This construction leads to a contradiction in result. By the court's 
reasoning, wells would not be point sources except in those states 
.. 389 F. Supp. at 1384. 
'''' 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(I)(D) (Supp. II, 1972). 
"" 389 F. Supp. at 1384. 
"" Id. 
"" Id. 
,., For arguments against the court's interpretation, .~ee text at notes 79-99, supra. 
'"' The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that legislative history can not be utilized to 
change the meaning of an unambiguous enactment. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 
(1961); Ex Parte Collet, 337 U.S. 55 (1949); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 
(1947). As the Supreme Court succinctly stated in Gesmo v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945): 
The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legislative history 
which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous signifi-
cance furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction. 
, •• 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. II, 1972) includes wells in the definition of point source. 
,., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(6), (14), 1342(b)(I)(D) (Supp. II, 1972). 
, .. 389 F. Supp. at 1384. The enforcement provisions of the FWPCA are found at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1311-28 (Supp. II, 1972). 
, .. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. II, 1972). 
'"' Id. § 1342(b)(1 )(D). 
"' Id. § 1311(a). 
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with approved plans. 112 It is doubtful that Congress could have in-
tended that wells be point sources in only certain states. In sum, 
imposition of limitations upon the applicability of a statute's defini-
tional section to other provisions of the act, as imposed in the GAF 
opinion, contravenes sound principles of statutory interpretation, H:l 
and makes little sense in the context of the legislation. 
The United States failed to assert another strong argument, 
which is based upon the FWPCA's definition of navigable waters as 
"waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."IU An-
other provision of the FWPCA states: "it is the national goal that 
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated 
by 1985."115 If the statutory definition of "navigable waters"116 is 
substituted for the words "navigable waters" the later provision 
would read: "it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants 
into the waters of the United States be eliminated by 1985." A third 
provision of the FWPCA defines "discharge of a pollutant" as "any 
addition of any pollutant to the navigable waters" is substituted, 
this provision would define "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addi-
tion of any pollutant to the waters of the United States."117 
The phrase "waters of the United States" should be interpreted 
according to the common understanding of the words. Colorado 
Public Interest Research Group v. Train 1l8 presented an analogous 
problem in interpreting the FWPCA. In Colo. PIRG, the EPA Ad-
ministrator had promulgated regulations excluding certain radioac-
tive materials from the statutory scheme,119 notwithstanding the 
inclusion of "radioactive materials" within the FWPCA's definition 
of pollutant. 12o Absent any qualification imposed upon the inclusion 
of "radioactive materials" by the provision defining "pollutant,"121 
the court held that the term "radioactive materials" must be inter-
112 Id. § 1342(b)(I)(D). 
"' A definition is "lt1he process of stating the exact meaning of a word by means of other 
words." (emphasis added) BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 510 (4th rev. ed. 1968). 
II. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972). 
",, [d. § 1251(a)(I). 
'" [d. § 1362(7). 
117 [d. § 1362(l2). 
'I< 507 F.2d 743 (lOth Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3011 (U.S. July 22, 1975) (No. 
74-1270) [hereinafter cited as Colo. PIRG.1 
,,. 40 C.F.R. § 125.l(x) (l973). 
'211 507 F.2d 743 (lOth Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 40 U.S.LW. 3011 (U.S. July 22, 1975). 
121 33 U.S.C. § 1367(6) (Supp. II, 1972) states that the term pollutant means "dredged spoil, 
solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sludge, munitions,chemical wastes, biologi-
cal materials, radioactive materials .... " (emphasis added). 
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preted to include all radioactive materials.122 Similarly, the statute 
imposes no qualifications upon the definition of "navigable waters" 
as "waters of the United States. "123 Therefore, "waters of the United 
States"124 should be interpreted as meaning all waters of the United 
States, including ground waters. 
Interpreting the FWPCA's definition of navigable waters J2rj ac-
cording to the plain meaning of the words is also consistent with the 
historical development of the concept of navigability.126 In United 
States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 127 waters which flow through normally 
dry arroyos12R were held to be "waters of the United States."t29 The 
phrase "waters of the United States"130 was interpreted by the court 
as meaning "just what it says: all the waters of the United States 
including the territorial seas."131 The court stated that the FWPCA 
"must extend to all pollutants which are discharged into any water-
way ... including underground waters."t32 (emphasis added). The 
122 507 F.2d at 747. 
,2:' 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972). 
12' [d. 
'25 [d. 
12' The Supreme Court once defined navigable waters as waters that . 
form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a contin-
ued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign 
countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water. 
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 
(1894), expanded the definition to include waters having the capacity for commercial use. 
"Navigable waters" was subsequently held to encompass water bodies having a past history 
of commercial use which were no longer suitable for commerce because of physical or eco-
nomic change. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); United 
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 
The concept of navigability was expanded by the FWPCA prior to the 1972 Amendments. 
See Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. 89-234, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 907 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) 
(1970), which provides that discharges into tributaries of interstate waters not themselves 
subject to the statute were subject to abatement if the discharges caused the water quality 
of the interstate waters to fall below required standards. See Hearings on Activities of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration - Water Quality Standards Before the Sub-
comm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 661 (1967). But see Save America's Vital Environment v. Butz, 347 F. Supp. 521, 528 
(N .0. Ga. 1972), for limitations on the navigability concept under the prior FWPCA. 
m United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Phelps Dodge]. 
'" An arroyo is defined as "a small steep-sided watercourse or gulch, usually dry except 
after heavy rains, and with a nearly flat floor and U-shaped cross section." AMERICAN COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY 70 (22d ed. 1968). 
"" United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. at 1185. 
'"'' :l:~ U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972). 
"" :191 F. Supp. at 1185. 
"" [d. at 1187. 
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Phelps Dodge court's reliance on the unambiguous definition of na-
vigable waters in the FWPCA constituted an analysis superior to the 
GAF court's reliance on an unclear legislative history. 1:1:1 
In United States u. Holland,134 non-navigable canals and interti-
dal wetlands above the mean high water line l :15 were held to be 
"waters of the United States" within the FWPCA's definition of 
"navigable waters."136 The court in Holland held that since the defi-
nition of "navigable waters"137 stands with no limiting language, the 
FWPCA is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability.I:1K 
Therefore, the court indicated that the mean high water line could 
not be utilized as a barrier to shield pollution since the environment 
can not afford such safety zones, and since the mean high water line 
has no rational connection to the aquatic ecosystems which the 
FWPCA was intended to protect. 13D The reasoning of Holland is 
applicable to ground waters since intertidal wetlands above the 
mean high water line and water beneath the surface are equally non-
navigable in fact. 
Although the concept of including ground waters within the 
FWPCA's definition of "navigable waters"140 may appear unlikely, 
it is consistent with the unambiguous wording of the statute,141 the 
analogies presented by other cases,142 and the language of other cases 
that expressly include subterranean waters within the definition. 143 
,:I" In L.A. Darling Co. v. Water Resources Comm., 341 Mich. 654, 67 N.W.2d 890 (l9fi::l). 
the Supreme Court of Michigan was faced with a similar problem in interpreting a state 
statute making it unlawful to discharge injurious substances into "the lakes, rivers, streams 
or other waters" of the state. 67 N.W.2d at 894. An order of the Michigan Water Resources 
Commission directing the defendant to install a suitable system to abate ground water poilu· 
tion was appealed on the ground that the state statute did not encompass subsurface waters. 
67 N.W.2d at 892-93. The court rejected this argument and held that "waters of the state" 
pertained to all waters including ground waters. 67 N.W .2d at 893-94. 
"" 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Holland]. See Water P()lIution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972 Reach Polluting Activities Occuring Ab()l'e Mean High 
Water Line- -United States v. Holland, 2 FLA. ST. L. REV. 799 (l974). 
"" The high water mark is "the line on the shore reached by the water at the high or flood 
tide." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1763 (4th rev. ed. 1968). 
" .. 373 F. Supp. at 671, 673. 
'''' 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972). 
'''' 373 F. Supp. at 671. 
"" [d. at 675, 676. 
'''' 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972). 
'" [d. §§ 1251(a)(1), 1362(7), 1362(14). 
'" Colo. Public Interest Research Group v. Train, 507 F.2d 743,747 (lOth Cir. 1974)' cert. 
granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3011 (U.S. July 22, 1975) (No. 74-1270); United States v. Holland, ::17:1 
F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. 
Ariz. 1975). 
"" Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 
562 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:545 
Admittedly several of the FWPCA's sections tend to indicate that 
ground water is not navigable water within the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 
1252(a) (Supp. II, 1972) requires the Administrator to "prepare or 
develop comprehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or elimi-
nating the pollution of navigable waters and ground waters" (em-
phasis added). 33 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(5) (Supp. II, 1972) requires the 
Administrator to "establish, equip, and maintain a water quality 
surveillance system for the purpose of monitoring the quality of the 
navigable waters and ground waters" (emphasis added). This lan-
guage, however, does not take ground waters out of the FWPCA's 
definition of "navigable waters." The statutory definition of "navig-
able waters" as being "waters of the United States" is clearly stated 
and should not be defeated by the presence of these two non-
enforcement sections of the Act. The definitional section applies 
"except as otherwise provided."I44 Therefore navigable waters are 
"waters of the United States ... " "except as otherwise provided" 
as in §§ 1252(a) and 1254(a)(5) (Supp. 11,1972). Inclusion of ground 
waters within the regulatory scheme of the FWPCA as "waters of 
the United States" is also consistent with the rule promulgated by 
the Supreme Court which forbids "a narrow reading of pollution 
control legislation,"145 and with decisions holding that Congress in-
tended to assert FWPCA jurisdiction to the maximum extent. ur. 
Federal regulation of ground water pollution through the FWPCA 
would clearly represent a constitutional exercise of power under the 
commerce clause.147 When the courts are faced with a challenge to 
Congressional power under the commerce clause, the exercise of 
Congressional power is upheld if the general activity which is sought 
to be regulated is reasonably related to, or has an effect upon, inter-
state commerce, and if the specific activities are those Congress 
intended to reach through the statute. 14R In recent years, the scope 
of the commerce clause has been broadly interpreted by the Su-
:191 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975); L.A. Darling Co. v. Water Resources Comm'n, 341 Mich. 
654,67 N.W.2d 890 (1953). 
"' 3:1 U.S.C. § 1362 (Supp. II, 1972). 
'" United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 226 (1960); United States v. Penna. 
Ind. Chern. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1973); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 
U.S. 482, 491 (1960). 
"" Natural Resources Defense Council v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975); Cali-
fornia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 511 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1975). 
"' U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
,I< Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1970); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Darby, 
:112 U.S. 100 (1941). 
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preme Court, where it has been utilized as a constitutional basis of 
legislation seeking to alleviate national problems. 149 The quality of 
ground waters has a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to con-
stitutionally validate inclusion of ground waters within the enforce-
ment provisions of the FWPCA.150 
Even if it is not accepted that ground waters are within the pur-
view of the FWPCA as "waters of the United States, "151 a significant 
portion of subterranean waters are still within its purview as tribu-
taries or portions of navigable waters, since ground waters are the 
major supplier of water for rivers, lakes, and streams. 152 This ap-
proach is consistent with the Senate Report,153 which states: 
The control strategy of the Act extends to navigable waters. The defini-
tion of this term means the navigable waters of the United States, 
portions thereof, tributaries thereof, and includes the territorial seas and 
the Great Lakes ... Water moves in hydrolic cycles and it is essential 
that the discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source. Therefore, 
reference must be made to the navigable waters, portions thereof, and 
their tributaries. "154 
In United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 155 the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for violation of 33 
'" Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that Congress could, under the commerce clause, prohibit pri· 
vate restaurant owners from discriminating against customers on the basis of race 1. See 
McMabon, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. IND. & 
Com. L. Rev. 672, 677-78 (1973). 
"" Since approximately 21.5So of the Nation's domestic, industrial, and agricultural water 
supply is derived from subsurface sources (supra note 2), the pollution of ground water 
resources would have a tremendous impact upon interstate commerce, affecting the desirabil-
ity of entire regions for residence and commerce, especially in view of the relative permanence 
of ground water pollution. The ramifications of the pollution of a subterranean metropolitan 
water supply, as threatened in Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), is posited as 
an extreme illustration of the potential impact of ground water pollution upon interstate 
commerce. The pollution of ground waters utilized for irrigation is another illustration of 
potential impact upon interstate commerce. Since ground waters are the major supply of 
water for rivers, lakes, and streams (see notes 11 and 12, supra, and accompanying text), and 
since they are in constant flow, the end result of ground water pollution is pollution of surface 
waters, a result which plainly is sufficiently related to interstate commerce to uphold federal 
regulation. 
''I 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972). 
'02 See text at note 12, supra. 
,0:, S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) in UNITED STATES CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 3742 (1972). 
'" fd. 
"", United States V. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Ashland Dill. 
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U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (Supp. II, 1972) notwithstanding the fact that 
the water receiving the discharges was a non-navigable tributary 
thrice removed from the navigable water into which it eventually 
flowed. 156 The court held that the FWPCA encompasses non-
navigable tributaries and portions of navigable waters,15i stating 
that "it would make a mockery of the FWPCA" if the Act's author-
ity was limited to the bed ofthe navigable water since "the tributar-
ies which join to form the river could then be used as open sewers 
as far as federal regulation was concerned."15x Limiting the 
FWPCA'S authority to surface tributaries would make a mockery 
of the Act, since the Act's provisions could then be circumvented 
by discharging the pollutants beneath the surface. 15u 
One of the two alternative rulings offered by the GAF court, that 
which would forbid discharges into ground waters which flow into 
or otherwise affect surface waters,160 is consistent with the reasoning 
of the Ashland Oil court. To sustain a burden of proving that partic-
ular ground waters flow into or affect particular surface waters 
would be difficult, however, given the problems involved in tracing 
ground water movement. The court in Ashland Oil mitigated this 
problem by shifting the burden of proof away from the party alleg-
ing a violation of the FWPCA so as to force the alleged violator to 
prove that the tributary or portion in issue does not flow into or 
otherwise affect navigable waters.161 But even if the burden were 
shifted, the FWPCA would not reach a significant portion of ground 
waters which are not proximate to present population centers. 
These waters are often found in arid regions, where the population 
depends upon them more than in areas with alternative resources. 162 
Thus, effective long range abatement of ground water pollution is 
possible only if the wording of the FWPCA is followed so as to 
"'; The court stated: 
Little Cyprus Creek is a tributary to Cyprus Creek, which is a tributary to Pond River. 
which is a tributary to Green River. The stipulation indicates that of these. only Green 
River is actually a navigable river "in fact" in terms of water borne commerce. 
[,04 F.2d at 1320. 
,07 [d. at 1325. 
!C,' [d. at 1326. 
'" As an extreme illustration, subsurface discharges a few yards away from a navigable 
river would be beyond the reach of the FWPCA if ground waters are excluded. 
"" ;{R9 F. Supp. at 1383. 
"H .'i04 F.2d at 1329. 
,,;, 8('(' text at note 7, supra. 
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include ground waters within the Act as "waters of the United 
States."183 
CONLUSION 
The objective of the FWPCA is to "restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters."154 If ground waters are beyond the reach of the FWPCA, as 
was held in GAF then this Congressional objective can never be 
achieved, since the entire regulatory scheme could be circumvented 
by subsurface discharges. Since in addition the Safe Drinking Water 
Act is limited in scope, and the common law is limited in force, the 
adoption of a rule excluding ground waters from the enforcement 
purview of the FWPCA would deprive the United States of an effec-
tive ground water pollution abatement scheme, a scheme which 
would be a reality if the currently available control mechanisms 
were utilized in concert. In fact, because ground water pollution is 
extremely long-lived, and because polluted ground waters eventu-
ally flow into and pollute other ground and surface waters,165 contin-
ued ground water pollution could have a disastrous impact upon the 
quality of all the Nation's waters. This impact could be mitigated 
if the FWPCA is interpreted to encompass ground waters as "tribu-
taries or portions of navigable waters." This interpretation, how-
ever, would not extend the FWPCA to all ground waters, and its 
effectiveness would turn largely upon which party would have to 
bear the burden of proving flow into or effect upon navigable water. 
Regardless, a significant portion of the nation's ground water re-
source would remain unprotected under this interpretation, includ-
ing ground waters in areas which have the greatest dependence on 
ground waters. 
The full objective of the FWPCA is achievable only if all ground 
waters are within the meaning of the Act, as "waters of the United 
States." This interpretation is consistent with the clear wording of 
the FWPCA, the holdings of analogous cases, and the objective of 
the statute. Since, if the FWPCA does not apply, other currently 
available mechanisms of ground water pollution abatement are inef-
'83 See text at notes 114-43, supra, for argument asserting that ground waters are within 
the FWPCA as "waters of the United States." 
'" 33 U.S.C. § 1251{a) (Supp. II, 1972). 
IB' S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) in UNITED STATES CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS. YANNACONE, supra note I, at 454. 
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fective alternatives, and since ground water pollution, if allowed to 
continue unchecked, will undermine the Congressional objective in 
enacting the FWPCA, the GAF opinion should be subjected to close 
scrutiny. The GAF court erred in its interpretation of the legislative 
history and of the language of the FWPCA and thus the opinion 
should not be followed. Ground waters are "waters of the United 
States" within the FWPCA's definition of navigable waters, and, in 
view of the importance of uncontaminated ground water resources, 
and of the Act's objective of restoring the Nation's waters, the clear 
wording of the FWPCA should be followed. 
